The radicalisation of lower middle class Greek families was the key to Syriza’s victory by Leontitsis, Vasilis
Athens, Credit: darkwood67 (CC-BY-SA-3.0)
13/02/2015
The radicalisation of lower middle class Greek families was the
key to Syriza’s victory
blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2015/02/13/the-radicalisation-of-lower-middle-class-greek-families-was-the-key-to-syrizas-victory/
A number of commentators have written on the extent to which Syriza managed to attract the
backing of a wide section of Greek society in its election victory on 25 January. Vasilis Leontitsis
writes that one of the key dynamics in the election was the support Syriza received from lower
middle class families. He argues that while such families had tended to vote conservatively in
previous elections, the net eﬀect of the country’s economic crisis was to radicalise this section of
the electorate and push them toward parties with more radical platforms.
The recent national elections in Greece have brought about a major shift in the Greek and
European political landscape. This is the ﬁrst time that a radical left party has won national elections in Greece and,
indeed, in Western Europe. This by itself is a major feat for Syriza and Alexis Tsipras, the party’s charismatic
populist leader.
However, there is one aspect that the post-election political discussion has largely overlooked. This is that behind
the radical shift experienced in Greece lies the fact that the average Greek family as a major institution of Greek
society is not necessarily inﬂuenced by the ideological struggle between the left and the right. Naturally, there have
been elements of ideational inﬂuence in recent elections. However, even more importantly, Greek families have
shown practical concerns and have fought, in many respects, for their self-preservation.
The radicalisation of lower-middle class Greek families
The family was and still remains the cornerstone of Greek society. It is based on mutual help and symbiotic relations
among its members. In a country where the state has never been able to provide a comprehensive social safety net,
the family is perceived as an inviolable institution able to absorb external shocks when necessary. It has thus
historically allowed its members to weather social and ﬁnancial storms.
Nevertheless, after more than ﬁve years of increasing
unemployment, household debts and a reduction in
its disposable income, the Greek family is now
struggling to perform this fundamental role. The
number of jobless households has surged in the
country: they now constitute almost 20 per cent of all
households. Additionally, dissaving (i.e. spending
existing savings to compensate for a lack of income)
is now the norm. Hence, the ability to retain a healthy
level of family income has been compromised.
Naturally, it is the lower-middle class families that
have suﬀered the most. Such families constitute the
backbone of Greek society. In the period after 1974,
the so-called Metapolitefsi (post-dictatorship period),
they managed to accumulate some modest assets.
By the beginning of the ﬁnancial crisis they were
therefore relatively aﬄuent by Greek historical
standards. They enjoyed a decent standard of living
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based on the solidarity ties of their members.
The relatively aﬄuent lower-middle class families of the past have become the nouveaux pauvres of today – the new
poor. They have lost heavily in terms of material wealth. Their ﬁnancial assets have vanished, but they have
retained a vivid memory of more ﬁnancially secure times. To add to this, they also feel humiliated and betrayed by
the traditional Greek political elites and their European partners. This has fuelled anger and has radicalised a
segment of the population that has traditionally been socially conservative.
This part of Greek society tended, until recently, to avoid abrupt political change. Hence, the political discourse of the
radical left used to drive such voters away. For years they voted either for New Democracy, Greece’s largest
Conservative party, or for Pasok, a centre-left party that has long lost its socialist roots. Both parties promoted
similar policies, increasingly based on neo-liberalism or watered-down versions of it. As long as the ﬁnancial
foundations of Greek families were protected, through economic growth and clientelistic relationships, they were
happy to retain the political status quo.
The acute ﬁnancial crisis overturned this ﬁne balance. The ﬁnancial collapse of the average Greek household led to
the collapse of old political appeals. The traditional political elites were de-legitimised and Greek citizens sought
alternatives either in the far-right through Golden Dawn, or in the radical left, namely Syriza. The latter, in particular,
swiftly ﬁlled the political vacuum. It oﬀered hope to a disillusioned electorate. It also oﬀered the potential to reverse
the measures that had crippled the ﬁnancial basis of Greek households.
The average Greek family has nothing more to lose. It has nothing to be scared about. This is why New
Democracy’s attempt to generate anxiety over the economy in recent elections failed to work as a political strategy.
With Greek families feeling lost, betrayed, and insecure, they were prepared to go to the extremes of the party
system in order to express their resentment over years of hardship. They were therefore ready to embrace radical
political alternatives, having dared to enter uncharted waters. Syriza’s victory made this clear: that the electorate
was ready to respond to the shaking of the most sacrosanct pillar of Greek society; the family.
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Note: This article is a reworked and extended version of a comment originally published in the Greek Politics
Specialist Group (GPSG) pamphlet on the Greek elections. It gives the views of the author, and not the position of
EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor of the London School of Economics.
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